Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

pursuing strategic dialogues with its allies <strong>and</strong> partners
in East Asia <strong>and</strong> the Middle East to determine
how best to cooperatively strengthen regional security
architectures to enhance peace <strong>and</strong> security, <strong>and</strong> reassure
them that U.S. extended deterrence is credible
<strong>and</strong> effective. 26
Despite a 20-year declaration by the United States
<strong>and</strong> <strong>NATO</strong> that U.S. NSNWs would be kept up to date
as necessary <strong>and</strong> deployed in Europe, <strong>and</strong> that these
weapons provided an essential military <strong>and</strong> political
link between Europe <strong>and</strong> North America, the 2010
NPR dropped this critical phrasing. 27 So did <strong>NATO</strong>’s
new Strategic Concept that was approved in the Lisbon,
Portugal Summit in November 2010. 28 These changes
in phraseology, while not highlighted by U.S. or Alliance
leaders, nevertheless represent a significant departure
from the st<strong>and</strong>ard post-Cold War deterrence
formula, <strong>and</strong> leave the door open for a future Alliance
decision to remove the remaining U.S. warheads located
in the European theater.
CURRENT U.S. NSNW FORCE STRUCTURE AND
MODERNIZATION PLANS
The George W. Bush administration emphasized
the possible role for nuclear weapons in regional contingencies
in its 2001 NPR. At the same time, however,
it pointed out that the United States had reduced its
reliance on nuclear weapons by increasing the role of
missile defenses <strong>and</strong> precision conventional weapons
in the U.S. deterrent posture. 29 Similarly, the Obama
administration, in its 2010 NPR, indicated that the
United States would reduce the role of nuclear weapons
in U.S. regional deterrence strategies by increasing
its reliance on missile defenses <strong>and</strong> precision con-
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