Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

CHAPTER 6
ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT RUSSIAN
PERSPECTIVE
ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Leonid Polyakov
After a successful conclusion of the ratification
process for the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START III) in January 2011, further progress in the
cooperation of the United States <strong>and</strong> the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (<strong>NATO</strong>) with Russia on issues
of nuclear weapons control <strong>and</strong> reduction is very important
for the security of all countries of Europe <strong>and</strong>
beyond. Meanwhile, it appears from the outset that
the most frequently addressed next step in this process
as insisted upon by the U.S. Congress—the start
of negotiations over tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs)
with Russia—will not be easy at all, <strong>and</strong> the chances
for success so far seem very uncertain.
In the absence of trust <strong>and</strong> good faith between Russia
<strong>and</strong> <strong>NATO</strong>, the Russian perspective looks quite
logical in its increasing reliance on relatively inexpensive
TNWs as a kind of “equalizer,” which compensates
for many existing or potential security shortfalls
of Russia. The prevailing mood at the moment reflects
the point that,
possession of the nuclear forces allows Russia to
maintain its military might at the level necessary to
deter from launching a massive attack the potential
aggressor, who may pursue the most decisive goals,
including the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons.
This allows providing for the defense of the state
under a significantly smaller amount of defense ap-
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