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Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

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91. Heuser, 2006, p. 212.<br />

92. In November 2005, the Polish Foreign Minister Radek<br />

Sikorski displayed a Warsaw Pact exercise plan from 1977, titled<br />

“7 Days to the River Rhine” showing very large scale Soviet nuclear<br />

strikes against Western Europe (except Britain <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> France),<br />

following a posited <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g> nuclear first strike. He emphasized<br />

that “the objective [was] to take over most of Western Europe. . . .<br />

This is crucial to educating the country <strong>on</strong> the way Pol<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> was<br />

an unwilling ally of the USSR.” He called it “a pers<strong>on</strong>ally shattering<br />

experience” to see maps showing Soviet bloc comm<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>ers<br />

assuming that <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g> tactical nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s would rain down<br />

al<strong>on</strong>g the Vistula to block reinforcements arriving from Russia.<br />

“About two milli<strong>on</strong> Polish civilians would have died in such a<br />

war, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> the country would have been all but wiped off the face<br />

of the earth.” It was scenarios like this, developed within a <strong>on</strong>esidedly<br />

Soviet dominated military organizati<strong>on</strong>, which seem to<br />

have changed Kuklinski’s loyalties <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> presumably had a wider<br />

emoti<strong>on</strong>al effect, percolating through the milli<strong>on</strong>s of c<strong>on</strong>scripts<br />

who passed through the Polish Armed Forces <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> may have c<strong>on</strong>tributed<br />

to their perceived unreliability towards the end of the<br />

Cold War. Nicholas Watt, “Pol<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> Risks Russia’s Wrath with Soviet<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>Nuclear</str<strong>on</strong>g> Attack Map,” Guardian, November 26, 2005.<br />

93. Barrass, pp. 213-214.<br />

94. Bluth, pp. 210-211.<br />

95. Ibid., p. 234.<br />

96. Barrass, p. 216.<br />

97. Sheri L. Wasserman, The Neutr<strong>on</strong> Bomb C<strong>on</strong>troversy: A<br />

Study in Alliance Politics, New York: Praeger, 1983, p. 134, quoted<br />

in Jeffrey A. Larsen, The Future of U.S. N<strong>on</strong>-<strong>Strategic</strong> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nuclear</str<strong>on</strong>g> <str<strong>on</strong>g>Weap<strong>on</strong>s</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> Implicati<strong>on</strong>s for <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g>: Drifting Toward the Foreseeable Future,<br />

Rome, Italy: <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g> Defence College, 2006.<br />

98. Barrass, p. 193.<br />

99. Kelleher, p. 449.<br />

72

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