Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

it would be more accurate to refer to the “non-role”
played by Moscow. <strong>NATO</strong> governments continue to
hope that the issue of tactical nuclear weapons can
be resolved through negotiations with Russia. This
has made it easier for all <strong>NATO</strong> members to defer
decisions relating to TNWs. But, as discussed earlier
in this volume, there is little reason to expect much
cooperation from Moscow unless the issue of tactical
nuclear weapons can be folded into some larger negotiation
involving conventional forces, missile defense,
strategic systems, <strong>and</strong> perhaps space systems.
The fourth complicating factor is the mixed messages
sent by the Alliance leader, the United States.
Washington could break the logjam on the issue of
TNWs either by unilateral removal of these systems
or by taking an assertive position on some other approach
in Alliance deliberations. It has chosen not to
do so largely out of concern for Alliance cohesion. At
the same time, however, the Barack Obama administration
has contributed to the growing pressure for nuclear
disarmament in Europe by its negotiation of the
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
in 2010 <strong>and</strong> by the President’s “Global Zero” speech
in Prague, the Czech Republic, in 2009. It would be
relatively easy for Washington to press the case for the
removal of the remaining TNWs from Europe as the
next logical step in this campaign.
A strong argument can be made for doing so, because
the risks associated with the current impasse
are greater than the risks of unilateral or negotiated
removal of these militarily obsolete weapons. The
first risk is that the current situation will resolve itself
by “disarmament by default.” This could occur
as, one by one, the European nations that currently
host TNWs fail to provide the necessary support for
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