Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

a civil war. The presence of nuclear weapons imposes
restraint. Their presence restrained the Soviet Union
when it enjoyed conventional superiority in Europe
during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War period, it
has been the compensation for Russia’s weakness in
conventional forces in the west <strong>and</strong> east:
Were it not for the powerful nuclear (especially tactical)
armaments, many in Russia would be alarmed
over the growing potential of the Chinese general-purpose
armed forces, <strong>and</strong> the specifics of certain military
exercises whose scenarios include offensives stretching
to hundreds <strong>and</strong> even more than one thous<strong>and</strong>
kilometers. 40
What Karaganov describes here is the geo-strategic
concept underlining Russia’s current position in
Eurasia. Russian strategic nuclear weapons deter the
United States <strong>and</strong> <strong>NATO</strong> from adventures at Russia’s
expense <strong>and</strong> provide China with an element of
security that permits it to play the role of economic
engine of Asia without the risk of American military
intervention against it. But at the same time, Russia’s
TNWs deter China from intervention in the Russian
Far East <strong>and</strong> Siberia. This view certainly can be seen as
providing Russia with some immediate security <strong>and</strong>
even some leverage on its periphery. But it does not
deal with a future in which nuclear weapons might
lose their deterrent capability in the face of more advanced
conventional weapons. This was the prospect
that Nikolai Spassky had mentioned in June 2009
in conjunction with the development of strategic,
conventional-warhead, precision-strike systems. The
further development of missile defense systems <strong>and</strong>
their further modernization raise questions about the
long-term value of Russia’s strategic forces <strong>and</strong> call for
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