Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

Mini-Nukes <strong>and</strong> Enhanced Radiation <strong>Weapons</strong>:
The Strengthening Veto of Public Opinion.
The <strong>NATO</strong> TNW stockpile had become an established,
though largely classified, part of the strategic
l<strong>and</strong>scape by 1968. It changed little, except by unilateral
reductions, until 1983. Political attention <strong>and</strong>
agitation focused instead on proposed new technical
developments. The first such development was
the possible introduction of “suppressed radiation
weapons,” that is, small “clean” warheads which
could destroy hard targets while reducing collateral
fall-out damage. The largely hypothetical prospect of
U.S. development <strong>and</strong> introduction of “mini-nukes”
was discussed at a <strong>NATO</strong> conference, then leaked <strong>and</strong>
denounced in 1973 as threatening to blur the boundary
between conventional <strong>and</strong> nuclear weapons. This
resulted in a mini furor indicating an increased public
sensitivity to newly enhanced tactical nuclear warfighting
capabilities. 94
It further complicated President Jimmy Carter’s
abortive attempt 4 years later to introduce TNW Enhanced
Radiation <strong>Weapons</strong> (ERW). These would have
replaced existing nuclear rounds in artillery shells <strong>and</strong>
were designed to offset the Warsaw Pact’s armored
advantage by eliminating tank crews through instant
doses of radiation, while causing less collateral damage
than other nuclear devices. The Germans, at great
political cost, 95 had given qualified support to their
deployment, but the story was prematurely leaked in
Washington, <strong>and</strong> ERW were relabeled as the “Neutron
Bomb,” <strong>and</strong> denounced as “the ultimate capitalist
weapon” that would kill people but leave buildings
st<strong>and</strong>ing. The neutron bomb dispute further incited
<strong>and</strong> strengthened Europe’s antinuclear movement
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