Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

mean that the strategic l<strong>and</strong>scape in the run-up to the
Chicago, IL, summit has a very different topography
from that anticipated even in the immediate aftermath
of Lisbon.
Talking of topography, in a European context
the main nodes in this debate have been Bonn, Germany,
<strong>and</strong> the other host capitals, Paris, France, <strong>and</strong>
the Baltic states. An overlooked, or at least relatively
uncharted reference point, has been London, United
Kingdom (UK). Partly, that is because it is to the UK
government’s liking. While it is one of three acknowledged
nuclear weapons states in <strong>NATO</strong>, it has tended
to pursue a pragmatic approach to the issue. As has
been mentioned, the key driver in London is concern
about Alliance cohesion, <strong>and</strong> especially the transatlantic
bridge, with a particular wariness about the potential
fallout in the U.S. Congress of any argumentative
flare-up in Europe that could be portrayed as a further
example of Europeans being reluctant to do their bit
to shoulder the security burden. For all these reasons,
London is likely to encourage—or at least not to find
unwelcome—any trends that extend the status quo
<strong>and</strong> keep the debate off the boil prior to Chicago.
There is, of course, an underlying concern in London
about any momentum that might start to build
towards Europe becoming a nuclear-free zone. There
may be a worry in Paris, <strong>and</strong> even a certain paranoia
<strong>and</strong> a little exasperation, that the British do not
view these things with quite the required robustness.
Maybe France does feel the pressure more acutely, as
potentially the only continental European power in
<strong>NATO</strong> with nuclear weapons <strong>and</strong> a continuing belief
in nuclear deterrence. Paradoxically, a reduction to
zero of the remaining U.S. nuclear weapons in the current
European host countries could actually increase
311