Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

31. Valasek, p. 24.
32. Lukasz Kulesa, p. 16.
33. On the concept of security perceptions, see Emil Kirchner
<strong>and</strong> James Sperling, eds., Global Security Governance: Competing
Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, London, UK: Routledge,
2007.
34. Intermediate options, such as the consolidation of TNWs
in one or two countries, would be politically unpalatable for any
host country after TNWs are withdrawn from any of the five current
host countries.
35. Even Germany, whose Ministry of Foreign Affairs had
taken a strong position in favor of change in the months leading
to the 2010 Strategic Concept, now seems to have adopted a more
moderate stance <strong>and</strong> seeks consensus without breaking ranks
with the allies.
36. According to open-source data, Italy hosts approximately
50 B-61 bombs at U.S. Aviano Air Base <strong>and</strong> 20-40 at Italy’s Ghedi
Torre Air Base. Italy possesses 69 nuclear-capable Tornado IDS
aircraft. See Robert S. Norris <strong>and</strong> Hans M. Kristensen, “<strong>Nuclear</strong>
Notebook: US <strong>Tactical</strong> <strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Weapons</strong> in Europe, 2011,” Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 67, January/February 2011, pp.
64–73. For a thorough analysis of the Italian case, see Paolo Foradori,
“<strong>Tactical</strong> nuclear weapons in Italy: Striking a Balance between
Disarmament Aspirations <strong>and</strong> Alliance Obligations,” Nonproliferation
Review, Vol. 19, No. 1, March 2012 (forthcoming).
37. The 2010 Strategic Concept maintains a conservative stance
on the purpose of <strong>NATO</strong>’s conventional <strong>and</strong> nuclear mix <strong>and</strong>
does not change its first-use policy, even against a non-nuclear attack.
Paragraph 19 of the Strategic Concept states in unambiguous
terms, “We will ensure that <strong>NATO</strong> has the full range of capabilities
necessary to deter <strong>and</strong> defend against any threat to the safety
<strong>and</strong> security of our populations” (emphasis added). It is worth
noting that this statement creates an important discrepancy between
the <strong>NATO</strong> position <strong>and</strong> that elaborated by the 2010 <strong>Nuclear</strong>
Posture Review of the United States, which commits Washington
298