Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

nuclear threshold to achieve more limited objectives,
which could bring about the end of enemy resistance:
The development of military strategy has brought
about a new global situation in which a limited strike
with “near-nuclear” means will be looked upon as an
“ordinary”combat situation not involving a general
nuclear collapse but only a serious loss for the enemy’s
military-economic infrastructure. The nuclear threshold
will be broken to the extent that employment of
missile defenses, hafnium bombs, as well as the destruction
of bunkers <strong>and</strong> caves by strikes with one-two
kiloton weapons become feasible. 34
Regarding Russia’s nuclear arsenal today there
is good news <strong>and</strong> bad news. The good news is the
claimed radical reduction of the arsenal that Russia inherited
from the Soviet Union, estimated in excess of
25,000 warheads in 1991, to a figure one-quarter of that
size, as mentioned by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov: “Presently, Russia’s non-strategic nuclear capability
is not more than 25% of the Soviet capability
in 1991.” 35 That is, Russia has eliminated a major portion
of its tactical nuclear arsenal, which was created
to support large-scale theater-strategic operations by
conventional forces involving multiple fronts <strong>and</strong>
strategic echelons. This reduction, of course, reflects
the reduced tensions of the post-Cold War world <strong>and</strong>
Russia’s deliberate decision to reduce its conventional
forces as part of an effort to revive its national economy.
Preparing for mass industrial war contributed
to the economic collapse of the Soviet Union. The bad
news is that, as the BASIC Trident Commission report
made clear, the Russian government sees TNWs as
playing a major role in conflict management <strong>and</strong> deescalation
under certain circumstances. At the same
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