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Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

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the Philippines; Singapore; Bangkok, Thail<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>; <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

Saig<strong>on</strong>, Vietnam could not deal with the behemoth<br />

United States as anything like equals, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> the occupied<br />

government in Tokyo had little leverage or desire<br />

to pursue a more independent military course. 33<br />

Largely impoverished, struggling for legitimacy, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

challenged by internal <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> external threats, primarily<br />

Communist in nature, these governments were in no<br />

positi<strong>on</strong> to gain insight into or influence over an issue<br />

as sensitive as Washingt<strong>on</strong>’s nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s policy.<br />

Moreover, there was little sense of cohesi<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g<br />

the nati<strong>on</strong>s of East Asia, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> in some cases outright<br />

hostility prevailed, as between South Korea <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> Japan.<br />

Individual allies were also situated in markedly<br />

different geographies, sharply distinguishing their<br />

percepti<strong>on</strong>s of the nature of the threat. 34 These factors<br />

prevented meaningful cooperati<strong>on</strong> am<strong>on</strong>g U.S. allies<br />

in the regi<strong>on</strong>, but even collectively they would have<br />

been outweighed by the United States at the zenith<br />

of its relative strength. Washingt<strong>on</strong> thus enjoyed tremendous<br />

leverage over its Asian allies, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> could easily<br />

ward off attempts to influence matters as sensitive<br />

as its nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s planning. 35<br />

But the rati<strong>on</strong>ale for Washingt<strong>on</strong>’s policy of preserving<br />

discreti<strong>on</strong> did not lie simply in its ability to<br />

c<strong>on</strong>duct such a policy. Rather, unlike in Europe (with<br />

the excepti<strong>on</strong> of Germany), Washingt<strong>on</strong> saw many of<br />

these putative allies as not <strong>on</strong>ly weak <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> vulnerable,<br />

but also as very possibly dangerous <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> thus requiring<br />

restraint if they were to receive potentially emboldening<br />

security guarantees. For much of the Cold War,<br />

Washingt<strong>on</strong> feared that Seoul or Taipei might, for parochial<br />

reas<strong>on</strong>s of their own, provoke large c<strong>on</strong>flicts<br />

which the United States strenuously wanted to avoid;<br />

Washingt<strong>on</strong> also feared Tokyo’s ambiti<strong>on</strong>s in the im-<br />

90

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