Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

Provisional Political Guidelines (PPGs) for the
Initial Defensive.
<strong>Tactical</strong> Use of <strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Weapons</strong>. Preliminary Anglo-
German operational studies presented in the Healey-
Schröder Report to the NPG in May 1969 considered
draft guidelines for employment of TNWs within the
flexible response framework. The report concluded
that most existing alliance doctrine on TNWs was
politically unacceptable <strong>and</strong> militarily unsound, that
it would not be possible for <strong>NATO</strong> to gain the military
advantage by using them, <strong>and</strong> that their initial
use should therefore be essentially political, that is, to
re-create a state of deterrence by convincing the adversary
of the risks of continued military action. The
report essentially saw <strong>NATO</strong> TNWs as having a political
signaling function rather than being designed
to assure a battlefield victory. Compromise formulations
accepting this were agreed to at the NPG meeting
in Washington in September 1969. But there was
no agreement about follow-on use. 89
<strong>Nuclear</strong> Softening. Further <strong>NATO</strong> studies followed,
leading to slow amendments of Alliance doctrine as
assisted by the further development of conventional
alternatives to nuclear weapons use. By about 1973,
“due above all to German pleading,” <strong>NATO</strong> gave up
the option of inflicting ground bursts on <strong>NATO</strong> territory,
thus contributing to the elimination of ADMs in
the early 1980s. The maximum yield of weapons that
might be used above <strong>NATO</strong> territory was limited to
10 kiloton (kt). In 1974 SACEUR Goodpaster was instructed
that all <strong>NATO</strong> nuclear targets should be military,
with their selection “based on the twin criteria of
achieving essential military objectives while minimizing
civilian casualties <strong>and</strong> collateral damage.” 90 This
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