Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

although it decided that the remaining short-range
systems, as well as conventional forces, should be
modernized. The Soviet Union <strong>and</strong> the Warsaw Pact
would soon collapse, ending the Cold War, so this decision
was never carried out.
<strong>NATO</strong>-Soviet Doctrinal Jousting. The long-term
background process which made it militarily acceptable
to withdraw so many TNFs was <strong>NATO</strong>’s eventual
improvement of its conventional capabilities that,
spurred by Warsaw Pact equipment improvements
<strong>and</strong> doctrinal innovations, resulted from Western
technical <strong>and</strong>, especially American, electronic advantages.
While continuing to exp<strong>and</strong> their theater nuclear
capabilities, the Soviet General Staff, led by Marshal
Nikolai Ogarkov, seems to have concluded in the late
1970s that their most effective option against <strong>NATO</strong>
would be conventional but extremely rapid deep operations
conducted, after massive aerial surprise attacks,
by operational maneuver groups. A tactical nuclear
exchange could only slow this offensive down,
as well as carrying the obvious risk of total nuclear
war. As Catherine Kelleher described the Soviet perspective,
“Ogarkov knew that many in <strong>NATO</strong> doubted
that their political leaders would agree quickly to
use nuclear weapons.” 100 The Soviets would fight <strong>and</strong>
pace “the war in such a way as to delay <strong>NATO</strong> taking
the decision to use nuclear weapons until it was too
late for them to be able to influence the outcome of
the war.” 101 Ogarkov advertised the forces developed
for this strategy as part of the military propag<strong>and</strong>a
surrounding Exercise Zapad 1981, by which time of
course <strong>NATO</strong> had to take account of the additional
inhibitive effect of the SS-20s discussed earlier.
<strong>NATO</strong> sought to frustrate that Soviet strategic vision,
whose operational details had been fully trans-
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