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Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

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time, it seems to believe that, in the absence of effective<br />

c<strong>on</strong>venti<strong>on</strong>al forces, low-yield nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s<br />

with special effects can be used to disrupt precisi<strong>on</strong>strike<br />

attacks <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> de-escalate a local war before it can<br />

become a general war leading to the use of strategic<br />

nuclear forces. The decisi<strong>on</strong> announced in April 1999<br />

to develop new TNWs remains unexplained <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

opaque because of the lack of transparency in this <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

other areas of Russian defense policy.<br />

The Russian view of its tactical nuclear arsenal<br />

involves a very different geo-strategic c<strong>on</strong>text, which<br />

can best be described as Eurasian. It takes into account<br />

Russia’s geo-strategic positi<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> involves the calculati<strong>on</strong>s<br />

of a great power in a complex geo-strategic<br />

envir<strong>on</strong>ment with multiple <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> diverse sources of security<br />

challenges <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> threats. Russia’s avowed primary<br />

objective is strategic stability, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> Russia c<strong>on</strong>tinues<br />

to see strategic nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s as both the technical<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> political manifestati<strong>on</strong> of strategic stability. Andrei<br />

Kokoshin has made this clear in an article celebrating<br />

the det<strong>on</strong>ati<strong>on</strong> of RDS-37, the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong>’s<br />

first therm<strong>on</strong>uclear device, in November 1955. It was,<br />

according to Kokoshin, the very foundati<strong>on</strong> of nuclear<br />

deterrence <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> strategic stability. Russia is perfectly<br />

willing to engage in strategic arms reducti<strong>on</strong>s insofar<br />

as they do not call into questi<strong>on</strong> existing strategic stability.<br />

In resp<strong>on</strong>se to Global Zero, Sergei Karaganov<br />

said a polite “no thank you” to any developments that<br />

would undermine strategic stability. <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nuclear</str<strong>on</strong>g> weap<strong>on</strong>s<br />

to Karaganov become that force which Goethe<br />

used to describe Mephistopheles in Faustus <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> Bulgakov<br />

subsequently cited at the beginning of his<br />

novel Master <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> Margarita: “I am part of that power<br />

which eternally wills evil <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> eternally works good.”<br />

The immorality of nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s is unquesti<strong>on</strong>ed,<br />

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