Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

• NSNWs, especially of older types, are believed
to be less protected by various blocking devices,
have smaller weight <strong>and</strong> size characteristics,
<strong>and</strong> are tempting objects for terrorists.
Russia does not concur in any of the arguments
mentioned above, except perhaps the second one.
Taking into account the relative weakness of the Russian
general-purpose forces, the Russian high comm<strong>and</strong>
may be tempted in case of a major conflict to use
TNWs to compensate for the numerical or technological
superiority of the attacking enemy. As to the third
<strong>and</strong> forth arguments, they may not be considered as
well-founded since now all Russian TNWs are kept in
safely guarded central storage sites <strong>and</strong> are equipped
with highly reliable blocking devices which prevent
their unauthorized use. The fact that there is not a single
proven instance of loss or theft of a piece of nuclear
ammunition testifies to their security.
Since there is no agreed definition of NSNWs, for
the purpose of this chapter we shall consider to be nonstrategic
all nuclear weapons except for the following:
(1) strategic nuclear warheads for intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) <strong>and</strong> sea launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs), <strong>and</strong> nuclear bombs <strong>and</strong> air-launched
cruise missiles for strategic bombers as defined by
New START; <strong>and</strong> (2) nuclear weapons that have been
retired from the stockpile, are no longer functional,
<strong>and</strong> are in the queue for dismantlement. Although no
official data on Russian stockpiles of tactical nuclear
weapons was ever published, Russia is believed to
have at its disposal an estimated 3,700-5,400 nonstrategic
nuclear warheads, of which some 2,000 are
deliverable. These include cruise missiles of various
ranges, gravity bombs, torpedoes, <strong>and</strong> depth charges.
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