Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

28. See Richard Halloran, “<strong>Nuclear</strong> Umbrella,” Realclearpolitics.com,
June 21, 2009, available from www.realclearpolitics.com/
articles/2009/06/21/nuclear_umbrella_97104.html; <strong>and</strong> Richard Halloran,
“Doubts Grow in Japan Over U.S. <strong>Nuclear</strong> Umbrella,” Taipei
Times, May 27, 2009, p. 9.
29. See David S. Yost, “U.S. Extended Deterrence in <strong>NATO</strong>
<strong>and</strong> North-East Asia,” in B. Tertrais, ed., Perspectives on Extended
Deterrence, Paris, France: Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique,
2010, p. 28.
30. Discussions with former Department of Defense official.
Even the official U.S. delegation sent to allay Japanese anxieties
was relatively junior in rank.
31. For a history of the Allies’ role in theater nuclear force
planning, see David S. Yost, “The History of <strong>NATO</strong> Theater <strong>Nuclear</strong>
Force Policy: Key Findings from the S<strong>and</strong>ia Conference,”
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3, June 1992, pp. 245-248.
32. For analyses of the reasons why U.S. relations with Asian
allies developed in this fashion, see Victor Cha, “Powerplay: Origins
of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia,” International Security,
Vol. 34, No. 3, Winter 2009/2010, pp. 158-196; <strong>and</strong> Christopher
Hemmer <strong>and</strong> Peter J. Katzenstein, “Why Is There No <strong>NATO</strong> in
Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, <strong>and</strong> the Origins of Multilateralism,”
International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 3, Summer
2002, pp. 575-607.
33. Australia <strong>and</strong> New Zeal<strong>and</strong> were different cases but small
strategic actors in any case.
34. Peninsular South Korea, for instance, worried primarily
about a l<strong>and</strong> attack across the armistice line by North Korean <strong>and</strong>
possibly Chinese forces; archipelagic Japan focused on the threat
to the northern isl<strong>and</strong>s from Soviet forces in the Russian Far East;
<strong>and</strong> insular Taiwan focused on the peril posed by military coercion
or an amphibious attack by the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) across the Straits. Once China shifted to the anti-Soviet
camp in the 1970s, it saw its main threat as the Soviet forces arrayed
across the long Sino-Soviet border. U.S. allies in the region
thus lacked the consistency of focus that <strong>NATO</strong> states possessed,
where the majority of the <strong>NATO</strong> countries were packed into or
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