Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

• Assets for future arms control talks (which the
Russians resist holding);
• <strong>Weapons</strong> category (which might undermine
<strong>NATO</strong> investments in more usable capabilities,
<strong>and</strong> that might not be sustainable without renewed
commitment to modernize dual-capable
aircraft (DCA);
• Reassurance for new East European members
of <strong>NATO</strong> (but the alliance TNWs are not located
in these countries, <strong>and</strong> could not be moved
there without provoking a major crisis with
Russia);
• Symbols of the continuing U.S. nuclear commitment
to its <strong>NATO</strong> partners (Professor Bunn’s
Wedding Ring Analogy: it does not matter
whether or not you wear a wedding ring, but it
does matter a lot if you wear it <strong>and</strong> then take it
off); <strong>and</strong>,
• Means of deterring Iran (but many more operationally
plausible nuclear assets exist for
this, <strong>and</strong> <strong>NATO</strong>-wide ballistic missile defense
(BMD) is becoming the preferred response).
Schulte maintained that, although the nuclear
weapons complexes cost the United States <strong>and</strong> the
Soviet Union trillions of dollars, TNWs specifically
spared <strong>NATO</strong> countries the enormous costs of maintaining
large st<strong>and</strong>ing conventional armies. The compounded
economic effects of this have been one factor
in higher western European living st<strong>and</strong>ards. And,
while contributing to the security dilemma throughout
the Cold War, TNWs were not in themselves a major
cause of instability: they improved the correlation
of forces from the <strong>NATO</strong> perspective <strong>and</strong> did not lend
themselves to “bolt from the blue scenarios” because
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