Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

supported by other members. However, whether this
focus means that Polish views are more congenial to
the eventual withdrawal of <strong>NATO</strong>’s own systems is
difficult to say. Moreover, given the conditionality of
such reductions, they are hardly relevant to discussions
today. Furthermore, <strong>NATO</strong> officials note that
the so-called “warming” in relations with Russia was
brief <strong>and</strong> that Polish statements on the need for Alliance
solidarity remain as robust as the others.
However, several Alliance members believe that,
on the contrary, this is an opportunity for <strong>NATO</strong> to
change its nuclear policy <strong>and</strong> posture. This is a variable-geometry
grouping depending on the types
of changes sought. Several members, including the
United States <strong>and</strong> the UK, would support adjusting
<strong>NATO</strong>’s declaratory policy, both for consistency <strong>and</strong>
also as a political signal. Others, including the “usual
suspects,” would go further in diminishing the role
for nuclear weapons by reducing <strong>and</strong> eventually eliminating
<strong>NATO</strong>’s sub-strategic systems; they also insist
on a higher profile for arms control <strong>and</strong> disarmament
in <strong>NATO</strong> security policy.
The Dual-Capable Aircraft States.
The DCA arrangements are frequently criticized
as being militarily useless <strong>and</strong> therefore having no
deterrent value. This is a complicated argument. The
DCA are operationally capable. The more pertinent
question is how likely is it that they would be used
given the other U.S. assets available <strong>and</strong> the complexity
of <strong>NATO</strong> decisionmaking. The DCA countries
themselves accept the mission, but for the most part
without great enthusiasm. Views in these countries
on the value of the mission vary—often according to
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