Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

tial expert on the dangers of nuclear proliferation, has
proposed that as part of a new <strong>and</strong> deepened dialogue
with Russia on the full range of Euro-Atlantic security
issues, <strong>NATO</strong> should decide to withdraw unilaterally
its sub-strategic systems within a period of 5 years. 13
While the target for completion is 5 years, the final timing
<strong>and</strong> pace would be determined by broad political
<strong>and</strong> security developments between <strong>NATO</strong> <strong>and</strong> Russia.
This proposal will certainly encounter objections.
However, independent of its intrinsic merits, the proposal
is an example of the imaginative initiative required
if the current deadlock is to be circumvented.
Prospects.
The task of the DDPR is to ensure that the various
components of the mix relate to each other in a coherent
package that reflects the political goals of the Alliance
<strong>and</strong> the economic resources available. In today’s economic
climate, there is every incentive to get the balance
right <strong>and</strong> to ensure that scarce defense resources
are being spent in the most efficient <strong>and</strong> cost-effective
way. In the nuclear field, there are major fault lines to
be crossed: on the purpose of nuclear weapons, on the
nuclear posture required, <strong>and</strong> on the appropriate role
for arms control <strong>and</strong> disarmament. Ideally, the DDPR
process itself should contribute to narrowing the differences
<strong>and</strong> finding common ground. The problem is
that progress depends on, <strong>and</strong> is effectively hostage
to, Russian reactions. The proposal by Senator Nunn
shows one way to confront this problem, but it is unlikely
to win universal support. It nonetheless demonstrates
the need for imaginative thinking unfettered
by traditional constraints <strong>and</strong> for high-level political
engagement, particularly by the United States.
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