Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

Nevertheless, Germany underst<strong>and</strong>ably continued
to seek to exercise control over nuclear decisions
within the Alliance that could affect how a war was
fought on German territory. 37 Germany dem<strong>and</strong>ed
that it should not be “singularized,” that there should
be no zones of differential security, that an attack on
any member of the Alliance must trigger an automatic
<strong>and</strong> immediate reaction from all others, <strong>and</strong> that other
measures be adopted to avoid any increase in the possibility
of war occurring on German territory. To these
ends, it insisted that <strong>NATO</strong> threaten the early use of
nuclear weapons. German officials often acted in a “silent
but positive partnership” with the British within
the <strong>Nuclear</strong> Planning Group, 38 but TNWs (which due
to their short range allowed for the possibility of a
nuclear war being fought only on German territory)
remained a more anxiety-provoking but inevitable irritant
for Germany than for other Alliance members.
Smaller Nations.
Smaller, exposed countries faced their own particular
nuclear difficulties <strong>and</strong> sought to maintain characteristic
choices within the Alliance. Norway repeatedly
rejected proposals to station nuclear weapons on
its soil in peacetime, as well as refusing permanently
stationed foreign troops <strong>and</strong> restricting Allied exercises
in the border region, as a reassurance strategy to
manage its relations with the Soviet Union. However,
Norway still participated in preparations <strong>and</strong> training
for Snowcat, the TNW-driven, all-out air offensive
scenario which dominated <strong>NATO</strong> air force planning.
This was an example of an ally pursuing policies of
both integration <strong>and</strong> screening: maximizing the Alliance’s
security guarantee through close cooperation,
29