Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

ers to produce income from Russian foreign trade <strong>and</strong>
to make high-tech weapons for the Russian military.
International factors overlay these domestic ones
in helping to determine Russian perspectives on
NSNWs. One of the most important factors concerns
relations with China, what some might refer to as the
“elephant in the room,” when it comes to dealing with
NSNWs in the European theater. The Russian view
may be labeled uniquely “Eurasian,” using the term
of one colleague, having to take simultaneous account
of Russia’s security situation in both Europe <strong>and</strong>
Asia. No other nation is so positioned <strong>and</strong> so potentially
vulnerable. With huge population discrepancies
across the Russian-Chinese border, the modernization
of China’s military, <strong>and</strong> China’s possession of longrange
nuclear weapons, it makes sense that Russia
would rely on NSNWs to deter a Chinese conventional
attack. Their use would be limited because of potential
damage to Russia <strong>and</strong> its population. In an actual war,
they might use three or four NSNWs before launching
strategic weapons on China. This helps to underline
the limited utility they have, should they actually be
used, <strong>and</strong> reinforces the notion that Russia needs to
develop PGMs as quickly as possible—weapons that
could actually be used somewhat more liberally without
excessive collateral damage to Russia itself.
Another international factor, which has a significant
domestic component to it, is somewhat spectral:
Russia’s place in the international system <strong>and</strong> how
Russian political elites conceive of it. This element
is extremely hard to measure as it relies so much on
subjective judgment, but the recognition that other
nations give to Russia’s power <strong>and</strong> the prestige that
Russian elites feel thereby are in a sense the starting
point for Russian willingness to engage in negotia-
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