Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

Two other factors will be important in the HLG’s
considerations. First, the new Strategic Concept appears
to attach high importance to burden-sharing by
calling for the broadest possible participation of Allies
in collective defense planning on nuclear roles, in
peacetime basing of nuclear forces, <strong>and</strong> in consultative
<strong>and</strong> comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control (C3) arrangements. Even
allowing for different interpretations of this formulation
<strong>and</strong> efforts to find new ways to give it content, it
would appear nevertheless to hint strongly at a continuation
of existing arrangements.
Second, the condition that further reductions must
be accompanied by reciprocal actions by Russia also
constitutes a substantial obstacle to changing the existing
arrangements. Thus far, Russia has shown no
interest in such discussions. Among several initiatives
to secure progress, a “non-paper” was circulated by
Germany, the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s, Norway, <strong>and</strong> Pol<strong>and</strong> at
the <strong>NATO</strong> Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin, Germany,
on April 14, 2011. This “non-paper” urged a
number of steps to increase the transparency of U.S.
<strong>and</strong> Russian non-strategic weapons. 12 The U.S. development
of an arms control negotiating position with
Russia in which sub-strategic systems are included
will take time. It also assumes Russian cooperation.
Moreover, a U.S. decision to negotiate these systems
will have to be made in consultation with the <strong>NATO</strong>
allies, which makes the work of the HLG in deciding
<strong>NATO</strong>’s requirements even more relevant.
The conditionality of further reductions on reciprocity
with Russia is a consensus position which, in
the absence of sustained political engagement at the
highest level, represents a formidable obstacle to progress.
In order to overcome this impasse, Senator Sam
Nunn, a respected authority on <strong>NATO</strong> <strong>and</strong> an influen-
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