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PART II RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS 107
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***** Comments pertaining to this r
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6. Aspects of the Current Russian P
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21. Arms Control after START ......
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this incredible amount of destructi
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hundreds of U.S. weapons (a
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TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND <stron
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Security was an additional problem.
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embraced lessons learned from the 1
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I learned here of some of the deep
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CHAPTER 1 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT Ri
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as just another kind of military op
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it, the Allies were unlikely to agr
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• Assets for future arms control
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ments are dissimilar. Whereas Europ
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CHAPTER 2 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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ombs in Europe as strategic weapons
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experiences of war, in a less moral
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Strangelovian image for NAT
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II. 1953-1963. U.S. STRATEGIC SUPER
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• For what political purposes mig
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widely heralded move to flexible re
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clear sentiment for the Alliance <s
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Nevertheless, Germany underst<stron
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first in order to break up his forc
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saw Pact lines to interdict strateg
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The Democratic People’s Republic
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given release authority by the Sovi
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III. 1963-1967. EMERGING DOUBTS CON
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esponse: without it, the Allies wer
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ous arms control groups argue that
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Why Did NATO Keep
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France were equipped with nuclear w
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slowly changing deterrence ethos wa
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through widespread protests, openly
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although it decided that the remain
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Page 86 and 87: 5. “The position we have reached
Page 88 and 89: 24. Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructe
Page 90 and 91: 49. Catherine McArdle Kelleher, “
Page 92 and 93: 76. Joseph F. Pilat and</st
Page 94 and 95: 100. Corroborated by Catherine Kell
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Page 98 and 99: the North Atlantic Treaty Organizat
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Page 116 and 117: These shifts are the products both
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Page 120 and 121: 7. Robert S. Norris et al., “Wher
Page 122 and 123: frey A. Larsen and
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Page 135 and 136: tions about what to do with their N
Page 137 and 138: CHAPTER 5 RUSSIAN DOCTRINE ON TACTI
Page 139 and 140: nuclear arms race was already under
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Page 143 and 144: eferencing the progress made on the
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Page 147 and 148: tion; namely, they are all the othe
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Page 155 and 156: ut their power imposes restraint up
Page 157 and 158: a civil war. The presence of nuclea
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Page 163 and 164: where cruise-missile-armed surface
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Page 167 and 168: enemy would remain unchanged. Comme
Page 169 and 170: and by internation
Page 171 and 172: Blank, ed., Russian Nuclear
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propriations, which is very importa
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are other security factors that Rus
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consequences for Russia’s nuclear
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taining effective verification mech
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military-technical sphere toward th
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ut in contrast to U.S. and<
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ather divergent opinions. Some argu
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Despite Russian hopes about the eff
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It is evident that the two sides ha
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19. Richard Weitz, “NATO<
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THE CONTEXT FOR NON-STRATEGIC NUCLE
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the ability to conduct huge quantit
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He then continues to condemn the pr
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with measures of power in internati
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In other words, the pursuit of a mi
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last until 2015, modern armaments i
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• NSNWs, especially of older type
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ed States and <str
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questions could facilitate progress
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CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES REGARD
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2. Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization <
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forme armii,” Vremia novostei, No
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thorized use. The massive shuffle o
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This chapter seeks to demonstrate t
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ut by most accounts are kept at nav
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likely determined by the limited ca
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was particularly troubling, as Russ
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the United States was expected to f
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mon belief about the role of TNWs v
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majority of Russians (even those op
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should be judged as largely unsucce
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Paradoxically, transparency itself
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Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov decl
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dard American strategy—inflicting
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8. For details of the debates on th
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19. It is ironic that confidential
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CHAPTER 9 INTRODUCTION OF EUROPEAN
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it would be more accurate to refer
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 9 1. Susi Snyder
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tegic Concept and
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tribute importantly to the delibera
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ound of U.S.-Russian arms control d
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of the aspirations for the DDPR is
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United States in consulting with it
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The United Kingdom. The UK’s inde
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er reductions but only if Russia un
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the familiar dichotomy of whether t
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Two other factors will be important
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Expectations for the DDPR are modes
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CHAPTER 11 EUROPEAN AND GERMAN PERS
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“consider steps to ensure the tra
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In its 2010 Nuclear</strong
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from an estimated 22,000 to some 2,
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a buildup of forces in China; <stro
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These contributions reflect the deb
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nuclear-sharing program. This is vi
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leaving a trail of confusion as to
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of special concern to Russia <stron
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permanent members of the United Nat
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18. Helmut Schmidt, Richard von Wei
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CHAPTER 12 EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES Pa
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suited to countering the main inter
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ventional alternatives are operatio
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legal issue, it is a political one:
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U.S. commitment to the defense of E
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ceived as subordinate to the more r
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If the wider concerns of those coun
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gram is seen with growing apprehens
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as an essential element of its secu
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and militarily wea
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“not to use or threaten to use nu
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While the populace in most European
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tion approach to a missile defense
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to nuclear threats emerging from th
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What it further highlighted is the
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stance on nuclear weapons use seems
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the potential value of British weap
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argue that there was no serious deb
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level of commitment among N
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Of course, the evolving European po
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 13 1. The author
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CHAPTER 14 AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON
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y U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. L
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CHAPTER 15 THE ROLE OF NON-STRATEGI
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has rested upon their operational v
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ons for their ostensible military v
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In Asia, the United States has long
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3. Maintaining strategic deterrence
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• Continue and,
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pursuing strategic dialogues with i
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open sources, there are currently s
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as a link among the NATO</s
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few more years, but with the ultima
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Government must ensure the continue
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States and the oth
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sure U.S. allies and</stron
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and Steven Pifer e
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and nuclear forces
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42. For representative arguments ab
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CHAPTER 16 NATO’
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contribute approximately 37,000 of
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with NATO (for exa
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time or offensive missions. A top F
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ingly precious funds on behalf of n
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their national interests so dictate
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whether the resources necessary to
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accounts of deployed American weapo
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While many disarmament advocates se
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nership, Russian military doctrine
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ar arsenal due to concerns over oth
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Gates also recognized, however, tha
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The United States Is the Only Major
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cussed above. Indeed, the very conc
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emoving European-based U.S. nuclear
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At the November 2010 Lisbon summit,
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in their roles fulfilling high read
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of the last century; “There [can]
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with a posture that lowers the risk
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5. Thomas Grove, “Analysis: Russi
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available from www.nato.int/cps/en/
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CHAPTER 18 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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several fronts. However, the sheer
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sional context as the important foc
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exaggerated emphasis on security in
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ployed strategic warheads. The INF
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der programs of cooperation, the Be
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on its nuclear warheads in Europe <
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2011, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavro
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General Arms Control Considerations
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inspection regime—which neither s
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Poles remain wary of past suggestio
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negotiate. While some U.S. official
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tage, since the United States has n
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confirm that warheads were not remo
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conventional force cuts. In the Mut
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 19 1. The Russia
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18. See, for example, Pavel Podvig,
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ief overview of current themes of c
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It seems fair to observe that where
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turn out to be inconsistent with mi
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widely understood to rely on CFE de
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Mobility. Are modern forces suffici
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trations of forces led to the origi
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By the same token, an NSNW regime i
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of old arguments about “defense o
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deployment and for
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the previous rationale for deployme
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in its interest for NATO</s
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to develop, however, the form in wh
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atify a treaty that would place leg
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exercises near each other’s terri
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This suggests that, if Russian lead
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here may be as much as can be expec
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they to be combined with commitment
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Europe and East As
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ole in pushing for United Nations (
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CHAPTER 22 THE CONVENTIONAL AND NUC
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sequently ratified by the United St
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ison to the Soviet Union an
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on resolving the long dilemma over
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Treaty Limited Equipment Group Limi
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It was exacerbated by Russian milit
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phasized that the 1997 NATO
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In response, NATO
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“host nation consent” for stati
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participating parties at 29 (absent
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and security-build
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United States and
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a detailed discussion of the state
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30. Committee on International Secu
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CHAPTER 23 SUMMING UP AND ISSUES FO
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States and its all
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ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS JAMES A. BLA
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DORN CRAWFORD, Lieutenant Colonel,
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transatlantic defense and</
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egional security developments relat
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