Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

What it further highlighted is the simple fact that
there is no unitary European perspective on this issue,
but rather an assorted <strong>and</strong> antagonistic array of different
views on the continuing utility of, <strong>and</strong> reasons for,
these weapons. As is now widely acknowledged, the
views range from:
• Southeast Europe (Turkey), where the proliferation
concern is right on the doorstep,
• through Eastern <strong>and</strong> Central Europe <strong>and</strong> the
northeast, where <strong>NATO</strong> <strong>and</strong> particularly U.S.
guarantees—including the nuclear one—remain
a very “live” concern in the face of what
many perceive as a still-looming Russia, <strong>and</strong>
where reassurance appears at a premium in the
light of the missile defense wobble,
• to the northwest, where states do not share the
same wariness of Russia or see another looming
direct threat for which a link to an American
nuclear riposte in readiness is the answer.
In the middle of all this is a rather agitated France,
perhaps fretting about what complications a debate
leading to the departure of U.S. weapons would add
to its own continued status as a nuclear-weapons state.
Then there is Britain, more ambivalent perhaps about
what it all might mean for its own arsenal, but concerned
primarily about Alliance, <strong>and</strong> especially transatlantic,
cohesion. These twisted sinews of argument
offer rich pickings for potential political, diplomatic,
<strong>and</strong> journalistic dismemberment.
Since they nudged the door ajar on the issue of
tactical nuclear weapons, <strong>NATO</strong> members have seemingly
recoiled after glimpsing the potential confusion
on the other side of the door. But they cannot, <strong>and</strong>
maybe should not, close the door again completely.
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