Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

arms race was on, <strong>and</strong> TNWs would be an important
part of the Russian response.
On November 17, General Nikolai Makarov, the
Chief of the Russian General Staff, speaking before
Russia’s Public Chamber on the condition of the armed
forces, warned about “the sharp rise” in the threat of
armed conflicts along Russia’s borders, which could
turn into a real nuclear war:
The possibility of local conflicts practically along the
whole periphery of our borders has increased sharply.
. . . Under certain conditions I do not exclude the possibility
that local <strong>and</strong> regional armed conflicts could
turn into major wars, including the employment of
nuclear weapons. 13
The response of Moscow’s mass media to these remarks
was, to a certain degree, hysteria: “The General
Staff is preparing for nuclear war.” Such reporting
took Makarov’s remarks out of context <strong>and</strong> missed his
point entirely, which was the progress being made in
the modernization of the Russian armed forces <strong>and</strong> the
challenges that remained. 14 The conclusion of this article
on Moscow’s media response to Makarov’s speech
was a pledge from the paper’s editors: “Our paper has
stated many times that without the support of civil society
no reform, including those in the area of defense,
can avoid failure. On this position we st<strong>and</strong> now.” 15
Viktor Baranets, the defense correspondent for
Komsomol’skaia Pravda (Komsomol Truth), had exactly
that underst<strong>and</strong>ing of Makarov’s remarks as expressed
by the editors of Nezavisimoevoennoeobozrenie (Independent
Military Survey). There was nothing new about
the possibility of nuclear war along Russia’s borders.
That has been a part of Russian military doctrine. But
Makarov had given the prospect a different context by
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