Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

ight metric (<strong>and</strong> things are still enough in flux
to leave uncertainty about what is).
• Economic <strong>and</strong> budgetary constraints are playing
an increasingly prominent role in planning—not
just in force sizing, but in development
<strong>and</strong> implementation of arms control
measures themselves as well (i.e., not just arms
on the cheap, but arms control on the cheap).
In this environment, some general objectives can
be discerned from contemporary efforts to update the
conceptual model for conventional arms control:
1. Promote European <strong>and</strong> regional security by
building confidence <strong>and</strong> reducing uncertainty.
• In a post-bloc environment, building confidence
is principally a function of knowing the
character <strong>and</strong> limits of others’ forces. There
being no formal “balance” to be struck, actors
acquire confidence from the stability <strong>and</strong> predictability
resulting from an agreed system of
limitations (of some sort), <strong>and</strong> seek what other
security arrangements they find necessary beyond
the arms control regime itself.
• Uncertainty is reduced by obtaining detailed
information on the disposition of others’ forces,
both static <strong>and</strong> dynamic, <strong>and</strong> conducting visits,
evaluations, <strong>and</strong> inspections to verify the information
supplied.
2. Maintain operational flexibility <strong>and</strong> operational
security.
• Given the continuing flux of force structure,
doctrine, <strong>and</strong> technology, parties will tend to
resist any obligations or constraints that may
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