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Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

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States <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> the other nuclear powers actually began to<br />

make significant progress toward their avowed goal<br />

of a nuclear-free world. If this last eventuality came to<br />

pass, it could potentially diminish the nuclear aspects<br />

of the U.S. extended deterrence guarantee. Moreover,<br />

if any ally or other state feels threatened by another<br />

party that is not committed to the goal of Global Zero,<br />

it may decide that its vital nati<strong>on</strong>al interests require it<br />

to violate its <str<strong>on</strong>g>Nuclear</str<strong>on</strong>g> N<strong>on</strong>-Proliferati<strong>on</strong> Treaty (NPT)<br />

pledge <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> pursue nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s for reas<strong>on</strong>s of<br />

nati<strong>on</strong>al security. The ally most often linked to such<br />

potential behavior is Turkey.<br />

Sixth, the United States does have real security interests<br />

in Europe, as well as in Asia <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> the Middle<br />

East. It maintains broad <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> deep cultural, historical,<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> ec<strong>on</strong>omic ties to its European allies. Those interests<br />

might be threatened by a more aggressive or revanchist<br />

Russia, by a nuclear-armed Iran, or even by<br />

the rise of multiple nuclear states in the Middle East<br />

(perhaps in resp<strong>on</strong>se to a nuclear Iran). There may<br />

also be well-founded military reas<strong>on</strong>s for deploying<br />

a small number of U.S. nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> their<br />

delivery vehicles in Europe for possible use in other<br />

regi<strong>on</strong>s. Obviously forward deployment of military<br />

forces does not apply merely to extended deterrence;<br />

it applies to many operati<strong>on</strong>al c<strong>on</strong>tingencies.<br />

Seventh, it is important to keep in mind that the<br />

U.S. nuclear arsenal has a number of qualitative characteristics<br />

that give it a unique character <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> set of<br />

missi<strong>on</strong> capabilities. This is an important variable<br />

to c<strong>on</strong>sider when determining future force size <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

structure in order to meet the multiple missi<strong>on</strong> sets<br />

that nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s are asked to perform. The three<br />

most important <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> broadly-based categories of missi<strong>on</strong>s<br />

for nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s are to deter, to prevail in<br />

c<strong>on</strong>flict, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> to assure allies. Each of those missi<strong>on</strong>s<br />

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