Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

Furthermore, the United States <strong>and</strong> its <strong>NATO</strong> Allies
will have to reconcile their DDPR conclusions with
their interest in arms control <strong>and</strong> confidence-building
measures intended to enhance transparency, particularly
with regard to their relationship to Russia. Unfortunately,
to date the Russians have demonstrated little
interest in arms control or transparency with regard to
non-strategic nuclear forces <strong>and</strong> have suspended their
obligations for reporting <strong>and</strong> transparency under the
Conventional Forces in Europe treaties. They continue
to refuse to discuss transparency regarding their nonstrategic
nuclear weapons until all U.S. nuclear weapons
are removed from European soil, <strong>and</strong> they have
insisted that future discussions should include British
<strong>and</strong> French nuclear weapons, a position rejected out
of h<strong>and</strong> by both of these nations. Even those nations
that are the strongest advocates of disarmament agree
that any further reductions should be undertaken in
the context of arms control negotiations with the Russians.
Finally, the most important <strong>and</strong> difficult task is
to change the underlying security circumstances that
lead nations to seek nuclear weapons. To that end,
direct negotiations involving positive incentives (economic,
political, <strong>and</strong> security arrangements) for states
willing to ab<strong>and</strong>on nuclear weapons aspirations, as
well as cooperation with others to impose sanctions
against recalcitrant actors, are essential. These are concrete
actions, analogous to the Marshall Plan, to take a
historical example, not mere gestures like the Kellogg-
Bri<strong>and</strong> Pact of 1929, which “outlawed war.” 34
<strong>Nuclear</strong> weapons are not empty symbols; they play
an important deterrent role <strong>and</strong> cannot be eliminated.
Foreign policy must be based on this reality. The
DDPR will reflect the Alliance desire to remain strong
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