Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

other, has ever gained serious consideration in this
dialogue, conventional or nuclear. In the end, a tank
is a tank, <strong>and</strong> a warhead is a warhead, <strong>and</strong> counting
rules for limitation <strong>and</strong> verification have had to proceed
on that basis.
Are numerical limits meaningful? Is there an alternative?
The persistence of questions like these testifies
to the enduring concerns of participants that qualitative
factors may increasingly outweigh quantitative
ones in threatening stability <strong>and</strong> security. While
NSNWs may not presently appear to be a hotbed of
technological innovation, it would be wise to consider
prospective developments in weighing the parameters
of any agreement.
Mobilization. What roles do reserve forces <strong>and</strong>
equipment stockpiles play in contemporary planning
<strong>and</strong> operations, <strong>and</strong> how have they changed for the
key players? Cold War scenarios for European conventional
conflict relied heavily on assumptions about
fleshing out, equipping, arming, <strong>and</strong> moving lowstrength
Soviet units, on the one h<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> redeployment
of U.S.-based units, while drawing equipment
from forward storage depots, on the other. By contrast,
while scenarios like these have faded from the
conventional scene, NSNW cases still rely on storage
considerations, but on grounds of safety <strong>and</strong> security
rather than mobilization. Can demating of NSNW systems
perform a role similar to conventional storage in
inhibiting potential for surprise attack? Conversely, to
the extent that familiar themes of nuclear deterrence
like survivability <strong>and</strong> retaliatory capacity still apply,
deliberate storage measures, <strong>and</strong> especially transparency
of the locations involved, may prove very difficult
to achieve.
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