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Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

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self from the c<strong>on</strong>flict. Of course, Germany was not the<br />

<strong>on</strong>ly Ally with reservati<strong>on</strong>s c<strong>on</strong>cerning the Libyan operati<strong>on</strong>;<br />

several other Allies showed little enthusiasm<br />

for the operati<strong>on</strong> in part because of their fatigue with<br />

the political, budgetary, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> pers<strong>on</strong>nel dem<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>s of<br />

expediti<strong>on</strong>ary efforts in Afghanistan <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> elsewhere.<br />

Meanwhile, Russia’s behavior has c<strong>on</strong>tributed to<br />

renewed attenti<strong>on</strong> to <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g>’s collective defense role.<br />

To be sure, Russia does not represent the type of immediate<br />

threat posed by the Soviet Uni<strong>on</strong>, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> no<br />

Allied government advocates a return to Cold War<br />

models of territorial defense. Still, Russian acti<strong>on</strong>s in<br />

Georgia (especially during the August 2008 c<strong>on</strong>flict)<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> elsewhere in the former Soviet space, combined<br />

with menacing statements—recall, for example, President<br />

Dmitry Medvedev’s vow “to protect the life <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

dignity of [Russian] citizens, wherever they are” 3 —<br />

sparked particular c<strong>on</strong>cern am<strong>on</strong>g Central <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> Eastern<br />

Europe (CEE) Allies. Indeed, some divine a deliberate<br />

Russian strategy that extends from acti<strong>on</strong>s to<br />

discourage investments in southern energy pipelines<br />

to intimidating Ukraine <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> other neighbors in the<br />

“near abroad” with substantial populati<strong>on</strong>s of ethnic<br />

Russians. Such c<strong>on</strong>cerns recently were heightened by<br />

Medvedev’s threat that Russia will take military countermeasures<br />

(to include deploying short-range Isk<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g>er<br />

missiles in Kaliningrad) to defeat <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g> missile<br />

defenses if they are deployed without “legal guarantees”<br />

sought by Moscow.<br />

Other Allies seem to assess Russian strategy <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

behavior in less threatening terms. Some are inclined<br />

to see Georgia as a <strong>on</strong>e-of-a-kind acti<strong>on</strong>—an opportunistic<br />

show of force to destabilize a weak but impetuous<br />

neighbor <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> prevent further <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g> enlargement.<br />

Similarly, noting examples of Russian cooperati<strong>on</strong><br />

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