Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

CHAPTER 12
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES
Paolo Foradori
Any discussion of European perspectives on the
presence, role, <strong>and</strong> future of U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons (TNWs) must begin with the caveat that Europe
(or North Atlantic Treaty Organization [<strong>NATO</strong>]
Europe) is not a unitary actor. Europe is a heterogeneous
ensemble of countries with different histories,
capabilities, international statuses, <strong>and</strong> ambitions
<strong>and</strong> with specific security cultures <strong>and</strong> threat perceptions.
This structural differentiation within the Alliance
must be considered for a full appreciation of
the convoluted dynamics of consensus-building that
characterize <strong>NATO</strong> decisionmaking. The expansion of
<strong>NATO</strong> to include former Warsaw Pact countries has
added further elements of complexity to the Alliance’s
institutional <strong>and</strong> political architecture. Therefore, this
analysis will sometimes refer to <strong>NATO</strong> Europe as a
whole <strong>and</strong> will sometimes differentiate between specific
continental, regional, <strong>and</strong> national positions.
This chapter is divided into three sections. In the
first section, I argue that a widespread consensus exists
within Europe that the strictly military value of
TNWs is now negligible, <strong>and</strong> that there are no realistic
scenarios in which TNWs could be employed. In the
second section, I argue that the European position is
largely shaped by <strong>and</strong> must be contextualized in the
increasing international support for nuclear disarmament.
With one main exception (France), TNWs have
lost their attractiveness as symbols of power, status,
<strong>and</strong> prestige. Moreover, their further reduction <strong>and</strong>
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