Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

atify a treaty that would place legally binding limitations
on U.S. missile defenses. Nor does it currently
appear likely that U.S. technology development will
be at such a slow pace that Russia will no longer need
to worry about where this might lead by the 2020s.
Third, even if the issue of missile defenses can be
resolved, the proposal that New START’s successor
treaty should include limits on warhead stockpiles
will involve formidable verification challenges. One
of the main reasons why the current Treaty limits only
numbers of missiles <strong>and</strong> deployed warheads is that it
is possible to verify declared numbers of these systems
with a high degree of assurance. But no techniques are
available to provide a comparable degree of assurance
for declarations of stockpiled warheads. A more limited
level of confidence can be provided through mutual
declarations on numbers of warheads stored (or
at least based) at designated storage sites, with some
attached inspection procedures. But it is likely to take
significant effort to develop these procedures in ways
that do not compromise warhead design information.
And neither party to a treaty can be sure that the other
does not have additional, undeclared, warheads in
storage.
FALLING TOGETHER, BUT SEPARATELY
There is therefore a considerable potential for
deadlock involved if <strong>NATO</strong>’s leaders were to see New
START’s successor as the only possible means for limiting
NSNWs in Europe. As a result, <strong>NATO</strong>’s Strategic
Concept was careful not to limit itself to this option:
In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek
Russian agreement to increase transparency on its
nuclear weapons in Europe <strong>and</strong> relocate these weap-
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