Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

here may be as much as can be expected in the next
phase of confidence-building. Were the security of
either side after reductions dependent on a reliable
accounting of the arsenal of the other, such unverified
transparency would not be appropriate. For the
purposes of confidence-building in relation to weapons
whose primary purpose is symbolic, however,
it offers the most feasible way forward. Neither side
would have anything to gain from concealing weapons
that would, in any case, be surplus to operational
requirements. This calculus would change were the
United States <strong>and</strong> Russia to seriously consider much
deeper cuts in the sizes of their arsenals (for example
to prevailing UK <strong>and</strong> French levels). Given current circumstances,
however, it may make sense to accept a
more limited level of transparency in return for making
progress in down-sizing arsenals.
WIDENING START
If there is progress on reciprocal U.S./Russia
NSNW reductions, it may be most likely to start with
a package along the lines outlined here. But such
a package should not be considered in isolation. It
would affect, <strong>and</strong> be affected by, wider processes of
arms reductions, both between the United States <strong>and</strong>
Russia, <strong>and</strong> involving a wider group of countries.
Given the difficulties that were involved in getting
the U.S. Senate to ratify the New START Treaty, the
prospects for a follow-on treaty during the next U.S.
presidential term are not high. Whether Senate objections
were primarily motivated by strategic or party
political considerations, the reality is that it is now
very difficult to conceive of a new treaty that would
be able to satisfy two-thirds of the U.S. Senate while
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