Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

Prague agenda with its goal of global nuclear zero
should fall flat. Another potential downside could be
that France takes on more of the nuclear leadership
role in <strong>NATO</strong>. This may or may not be a bad thing,
but it would certainly represent a stark change from
the Alliance’s comfortable security assumptions since
the late 1960s.
Fourth, the West may decide to keep its remaining
NSNWs as potential bargaining chips with Russia
in future arms control negotiations. For example, U.S.
nuclear warheads may be useful in obtaining a Russian
commitment to reduce its numbers, to consolidate
its weapons in more centralized facilities, to increase
transparency, to de-mate the warheads from the delivery
systems, to sharing security efforts, or simply to
undertake no further increases. 51 Reductions may include
on entire series of steps, such as setting discrete
limits on the number of NSNWs warheads, establishing
a single limit on all nuclear warheads (including
non-strategic <strong>and</strong> nondeployed), limiting NSNWs to
national boundaries, limiting declared storage facilities,
or linking NSNW reductions <strong>and</strong> conventional
limits or cuts. The challenge may be a lack of incentive
for Russia to agree to any of these steps, given the
huge disparity between its NSNW stockpile <strong>and</strong> that
of the United States.
Fifth, given the U.S. nonproliferation agenda, it
needs to weigh the possibility that if it removes its
remaining forward-deployed weapons from Europe,
one or two <strong>NATO</strong> allies may decide that they need
to develop an indigenous nuclear weapons capability.
They may choose this path if the United States were to
remove its extended deterrence guarantee, or if they
no longer felt assured that the United States would
come to their aid when necessary, or if the United
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