Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

THE RUSSIAN NSNW POSITION: LIMITS AND
CONDITIONS OF EVOLUTION
The Russian position on TNWs appears very static
<strong>and</strong> also very stable. The rationale for keeping a relatively
large arsenal of such nuclear weapons appears
relatively weak: short-range weapons do not have a
role while retention of intermediate-range assets enjoys
limited support in the Air Force, with only the
Navy appearing to be a die-hard advocate of keeping
them. Of greater importance is the fact that support
for the reduction of sub-strategic weapons does not
exist at all. While the reasons for that alignment of
interests <strong>and</strong> positions are political <strong>and</strong> more often
than not psychological, their strength should not be
underestimated. Hence, again, it is difficult to expect
a major shift in the Russian attitude toward NSNWs in
the near future.
The current Russian position, which conditions any
dialogue on NSNWs in the context of a proposed withdrawal
of U.S. TNWs from Europe, has a certain logic
behind it, as discussed earlier (since <strong>NATO</strong> has conventional
superiority over Russia, it does not need nuclear
weapons). More important, the Russian position
is calculated to avoid discussion of Russian NSNWs.
Moscow has calculated—correctly—that <strong>NATO</strong> would
not be able to agree on complete withdrawal. Difficult
deliberations within the Alliance during the last several
years (in the run-up to the Tallinn, Estonia, ministerial
meeting, continuing to the Lisbon, Portugal,
summit, <strong>and</strong> now in the context of <strong>NATO</strong>’s upcoming
Defense <strong>and</strong> Deterrence Posture Review (DDPR) have
confirmed the validity of this calculation.
If anything, the Russian position has only toughened.
During the New START ratification hearings,
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