Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

cerning its nuclear posture. On the issue of declaratory
policy, several members insist that <strong>NATO</strong> declaratory
policy should be consistent with the language in
the U.S. <strong>Nuclear</strong> Posture Review (NPR). As previously
discussed, France has been firmly opposed thus far to
any change in the existing language on the purpose of
nuclear weapons, believing that such a change could
suggest a diminution of the role of nuclear deterrence.
A senior <strong>NATO</strong> diplomat noted the irony of the situation
in which French nuclear forces are outside of
<strong>NATO</strong>, but France continues to influence what <strong>NATO</strong>
says about <strong>NATO</strong>’s nuclear forces. 11 Bridging the current
differences on declaratory policy will require
imaginative drafting, <strong>and</strong> in the view of many <strong>NATO</strong>
officials the sensitivities involved mean that this issue
will have to be decided at the highest level.
With regard to <strong>NATO</strong>’s nuclear posture, the HLG
completed a review of nuclear requirements in 2009
based on the guidance in the 1999 Strategic Concept.
Since the Strategic Concept called for the presence of
U.S. nuclear warheads in Europe, it is not surprising
that the review confirmed the continuing relevance of
the DCA as the most appropriate means of deploying
them. As <strong>NATO</strong>’s new Strategic Concept contains no
reference to the presence in Europe of U.S. nuclear
warheads, it is assumed that the HLG will pose the
fundamental questions concerning the requirements
for extended deterrence <strong>and</strong> the continuing need for
the deployment of these warheads. According to officials,
in responding to the tasking set by the NAC, the
HLG has developed a range of options which include
the status quo but also the possibility of reducing the
number of warheads or adjusting the DCA missions.
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