Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

<strong>and</strong> security-building measures) <strong>and</strong> the Open Skies
Treaty. These agreements provide an existing level
of reassurance concerning conventional forces that
should not be discounted. This is particularly true in
the current security environment where the prospects
of a major conflict in Europe seem remote. Still both
can be strengthened <strong>and</strong> improved. The Vienna Document
has not been changed or even tweaked since
1999, despite Russia’s indication of interest in new
proposals. 26 But it is still critical to remember that ultimately
these agreements, while important, may not be
a full substitute for an agreement that includes legally
binding limits, information exchanges, <strong>and</strong> a verification
regime. 27
SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS
Arms control negotiations do not occur in a vacuum
but rather are part of the ongoing political process
within <strong>and</strong> between states. Consequently, prospects
for success in conventional arms control <strong>and</strong> reductions
in NSNWs may be limited in 2012 owing to both
Russian <strong>and</strong> American national elections. In the meanwhile,
it may still be possible to pursue cooperative
security efforts between <strong>NATO</strong> <strong>and</strong> Russia concerning
NSNWs.
This eventuality may, however, require a new paradigm
for thinking about arms control when dealing
with such weapons. Policymakers need to consider
that the dramatic reduction in tensions has greatly
reduced the possibility of a conflict between <strong>NATO</strong>
<strong>and</strong> Russia. Consequently, NSNWs may actually pose
a greater common threat to both sides based on the
possibility that they could fall into the h<strong>and</strong>s of a terrorist
group <strong>and</strong> be used against either Russia or the
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