Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

into the discussion is that it would be difficult in a
new agreement to reduce deployed strategic nuclear
warheads to a level below the New START limit of
1,550 without addressing the thous<strong>and</strong>s of NSNWs
(<strong>and</strong> nondeployed strategic warheads) in the sides’
arsenals. Indeed, a primary critique of New START
during the 2010 Senate ratification debate was that it
failed to deal with non-strategic weapons; the treaty’s
ratification resolution required that the administration
seek within 1 year of New START’s entry into force to
initiate negotiations to reduce the disparity between
the United States <strong>and</strong> Russia in such arms.
Anticipating possible new negotiations with Russia,
the administration in February 2011 set up interagency
working groups to explore options for addressing
NSNWs <strong>and</strong> to examine the kinds of verification
measures that would be necessary to monitor limits
on them. On March 29, 2011, U.S. National Security
Advisor Tom Donilon said that reciprocal transparency
on the “numbers, types, <strong>and</strong> locations of nonstrategic
forces in Europe” should be an initial step in
getting ready for negotiations on such systems. 9 U.S.
officials raised the subject of NSNWs in consultations
with their Russian counterparts over the course of
2011, but there was no indication of an agreement to
address these in a more formal negotiation.
<strong>NATO</strong> considerations will factor heavily in the
U.S. arms control approach on NSNWs. The November
2010 <strong>NATO</strong> summit produced a new Strategic
Concept, which reaffirmed the importance of nuclear
deterrence for Alliance security. It also noted that
<strong>NATO</strong> would “seek to create the conditions for further
reductions [of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe]
in the future,” adding that the Alliance should
“seek Russian agreement to increase transparency
415