Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

any U.S. NSNWs deployed or stored in any bases in
the Pacific theater. This has been the case since the removal
of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea in
1992, <strong>and</strong> was made permanent with the retirement
of the TLAM-Ns beginning in 2010. 39 Finally, there are
apparently no longer any reserve DCA forces based in
the United States upon which the alliance can call. 40 In
the future, the F-35 will presumably provide the United
States with an expeditionary dual-capable vehicle
in regional contingencies, but those plans are yet to be
determined.
THE ROLE OF NSNWs IN <strong>NATO</strong> POLICY AND
ALLIANCE STRATEGY
During the Cold War, America’s extended deterrence
commitments were commonly equated with nuclear
weapons. <strong>Nuclear</strong> weapons alone do not ensure
the credibility of deterrence, but they may be indispensable
to achieving that goal. The level of commitment
<strong>and</strong> credibility required for extended deterrence
to work has very little to do with how the United States
feels about that commitment. It is the mind of the protected
partner that must be assured of America’s commitment,
<strong>and</strong> the mind of the potential adversary that
must be similarly convinced of America’s capabilities,
<strong>and</strong> will.
Some analysts have questioned whether the United
States needs to continue to deploy nuclear weapons
in Europe. After all, they say, it has been 20 years
since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact <strong>and</strong> demise of
the Soviet Union; surely these weapons are no longer
needed to ensure peace in a Europe whole <strong>and</strong> free.
Yet official <strong>NATO</strong> policy still views NSNWs as a deterrent
to any potential adversary, <strong>and</strong> they also serve
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