Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

y U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Larsen argues
that missile defenses cannot do so until the arrival of
a technology <strong>and</strong> weapons regime in which the defense
is superior to offense—an eventuality not yet
on the foreseeable horizon. Michel argues that missile
defenses cannot provide sufficient confidence for Europeans
confronted by so many Russian NSNWs <strong>and</strong>
by strident Russian objections to missile defenses in
Europe.
Despite the political <strong>and</strong> budgetary pressures for
defense reductions, the authors articulated the continuity
of the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence
in Europe as expressed by the Barack Obama administration
in various national security pronouncements.
But Michel points out that the Schlesinger Task Force
Report of 2008, apparently for the first time in so public
a manner, revealed some of the internal disagreements
within the U.S. military on whether the country
should continue to bear the cost of this burden. Larsen
notes that, while the 2010 NPR reinforces the American
commitment to the classic burden-sharing deal of
<strong>NATO</strong> nations hosting U.S. nuclear weapons, the NPR
also announces U.S. plans to modernize its nuclear
long-range strike capabilities <strong>and</strong> to work toward replacing
the deterrence function of nuclear weapons
with conventional <strong>and</strong> missile defense capabilities.
Some analysts wonder whether the United States
might take the kind of approach to extended deterrence
in Europe that it has already taken in Asia—removal
of the nuclear weapons themselves but regularly
exercising the capability to employ them in the
region as a visible reminder to potential adversaries
<strong>and</strong> assurance to existing allies. Both authors suggest
that removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe is
not likely, at least not in the near future. The deploy-
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