Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

should be judged as largely unsuccessful. Strong nonnuclear
capability will hardly emerge before the end
of this decade <strong>and</strong> will more likely be well into the
next one. Consequently, nuclear weapons retain potentially
high value, not only in the eyes of the military
but also in the eyes of the public, the latter mostly for
psychological reasons. The military will be reluctant
to sacrifice even assets that are seemingly unnecessary
until such time as the new military posture becomes
clearer <strong>and</strong> the outcome of the ongoing stage of military
reform can be reasonably well anticipated.
Parochial Group Politics.
The current Russian position on TNWs can also be
attributed to a peculiar alignment of relevant interest
groups within the military. As was noted above,
NSNWs do not figure prominently in the current
nuclear strategy, but this generalization does not apply
equally to all parts of the military. The Navy is interested
in keeping TNWs as a “just-in-case” option, 19
especially vis-à-vis the U.S. Navy. In contrast, the Air
Force appears much less interested in TNWs except
for weapons assigned to Tu-22M3 medium bombers.
Other groups such as the ground forces, having
all but lost them, probably have even less interest in
TNWs. While the majority of the forces have limited
interest in NSNWs <strong>and</strong> could, with the right set of inducements,
support reductions, they will not take the
lead in investing political resources to support such a
policy. Thus, outside the Navy, support for NSNWs
can be characterized as “a mile wide, but a foot deep.”
The Navy, however, has a strong <strong>and</strong> focused interest
in maintaining NSNWs. In the absence of a strong
opposing constituency, its interest inevitably prevails.
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