Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

to develop, however, the form in which reciprocal reduction
was pursued would be critical in determining
whether progress could be realized. There are, broadly
speaking, two possible ways forward: inclusion of
NSNWs in treaty-based arms reductions, or reciprocal
reductions outside a treaty framework.
The main proposal currently being discussed under
the first heading is for the next round of bilateral
arms reductions to include limits on the total warhead
stockpiles of both Russia <strong>and</strong> the United States. All
nuclear weapons, it is now being argued, are “strategic”
in their effects. NSNWs should therefore be included
in any future agreement to reduce stockpiles.
One of the advantages of this approach is that it
provides a way to address the problem of negotiating
reductions in NSNWs when there is a large numerical
disparity between U.S. <strong>and</strong> Russia forces in this category.
Within an overall ceiling, the United States <strong>and</strong>
Russia could separately decide the mix of weapon systems
that they chose to maintain. Russia might decide,
for example, to maintain more short-range NSNW
warheads. The United States, by contrast, might prefer
to keep a greater capability to “upload” its strategic
missiles or bombers. Such an approach, since it
would set global limits, would also avoid the adverse
reaction from America’s Asian allies that could be anticipated
were an attempt made to limit the scope of
any new treaty to U.S. <strong>and</strong> Russian NSNW arsenals
in Europe. Both Russia <strong>and</strong> the United States would
still retain the option of shifting nuclear forces from
Europe to Asia. But they would not be given a treatybased
incentive to do so.
There are, however, some drawbacks to the allinclusive
treaty approach. First, it would mark an important
dilution of the attention hitherto given to the
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