Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

ferred to by the now familiar term “appropriate mix
of capabilities.”
As is inevitable with all compromises, the Review
did not please everyone, <strong>and</strong> its implementation is
viewed by members with varying degrees of enthusiasm.
One national official’s comment that the DDPR
resembles the blind man’s elephant reflects the general
uncertainty about the nature <strong>and</strong> the expected
outcome of the Review. 5 Furthermore, <strong>and</strong> equally
inevitably, the very differences that required the compromise
have reemerged, making progress difficult
<strong>and</strong> the final outcome hard to predict.
Deterrence <strong>and</strong> Defense Posture Process.
An initial period of reflection comprising seminars
with outside experts is to be followed by inputs
from the four primary areas considered most relevant
to the appropriate mix of forces: conventional forces,
nuclear forces, missile defense, <strong>and</strong> arms control <strong>and</strong>
disarmament. Guidance on what questions should be
addressed in each field was provided by the <strong>NATO</strong>
Council (NAC) in the form of what are termed “taskings.”
The difficulty in agreeing on the wording of
these “taskings”—so that they did not prejudge the
outcome—gave an indication of the problems that lie
ahead. The NAC has emphasized that it wants options
rather than conclusions or recommendations, which
are the prerogative of the NAC itself. The final document
is to be endorsed at the next <strong>NATO</strong> Summit in
Chicago, IL, on May 20, 2012.
It still being too early to foresee outcomes, what
follows is a brief overview of each area, with a specific
focus on nuclear affairs because they will be the
centerpiece of the Review. It should be noted that one
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