Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

the late General Vladimir Slipchenko, categorized this
transformation as a “sixth generation of warfare,”
which is in the process of superseding the fifth generation,
that is, nuclear war, which had become both
politically <strong>and</strong> militarily untenable. Slipchenko even
held out the prospect of conducting major wars as
“no-contact” conflicts, when the forces <strong>and</strong> concepts
driving this transformation have reached maturity. 30
Current efforts at the reform of the Russian Army under
the direction of Minister Dmitri Serdiukov <strong>and</strong>
Chief of the General Staff, General Nikolai Makarov,
which began in late 2008 after the Russo-Georgian
conflict, are based upon the modernization of Russia’s
conventional forces <strong>and</strong> include a shift to a brigadebased
combat structure <strong>and</strong> enhanced comm<strong>and</strong>,
control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, <strong>and</strong> reconnaissance (C4ISR), associated
with the concept of network-centric warfare.
But U.S. advanced conventional systems were not
the only concern for the Russian General Staff. Commenting
on U.S. research on using an isomeric form
of hafnium to create a nuclear weapon that did not
require critical mass, Russian analysts noted the interest
in the Pentagon in the development of a new generation
of advanced TNWs that could be transformed
into precision-strike nuclear weapons of various
types. These were described as weapons occupying
a place between advanced conventional systems <strong>and</strong>
traditional nuclear weapons. 31 First Deputy Chief of
the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Yuri
Baluevsky was reported to have said: “Shouldn’t we
review our own nuclear strategy? I think, yes.” Baluevsky
did not go on to say that Russia should pursue
such weapons directly, but remarked only that Russia
would not reduce its arsenal of TNWs. 32
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