Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

38. Heuser, 2006, p. 225.
39. Kjell Inge Bjerga <strong>and</strong> Kjetil Skogr<strong>and</strong>, “Securing Small
State Interests,” Mastny, Holtsmark, <strong>and</strong> Wenger, 2006, p. 233.
40. Jonathan Soborg Agger <strong>and</strong> Trine Engholm Michelsen,
“How Strong Was the Weakest Link?” Mastny, Holtsmark, <strong>and</strong>
Wenger, 2006, pp. 250-251.
41. Mastny, “Imagining War in Europe,” Mastny, Holtsmark,
<strong>and</strong> Wenger, 2006, pp. 19-25.
42. For a full discussion of this central concept in Marxist strategic
analysis at its intellectual height, see Richard E. Porter “Correlation
of Forces: Revolutionary Legacy,” Air University Review,
March-April 1977.
43. David Holloway, The Soviet Union <strong>and</strong> the Arms Race, New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1983, p. 57.
44. What former Soviet General Valentin V. Larionov retrospectively
dubbed the “romantic” period of naive belief in the
nuclear arms’ capacity to “achieve any political or military objective,
even the most extreme ones.” Mastny, “Imagining War in
Europe,” in Mastny, Holtsmark, <strong>and</strong> Wenger, eds., 2006, p. 25.
45. Matthias Uhl, “Storming onto Paris,” in Mastny, Holtsmark,
<strong>and</strong> Wenger, 2006, p. 65.
46. Ibid., pp. 52-58.
47. “One point is clear, however: at the peak of the second
Berlin crisis, the military leadership of the Warsaw Pact believed
that nuclear war could be fought, <strong>and</strong>, in fact, saw nuclear war as
the key instrument of destroying the supposed enemy.” Ibid.
48. General Sir Horatius Murray, Comm<strong>and</strong>er in Chief, Allied
Forces, Northern Europe (CINCNORTH) 1958-61, quoted by
Kjell Inge Bjerga <strong>and</strong> Kjetil Skogr<strong>and</strong>, in Mastny, Holtsmark, <strong>and</strong>
Wenger, 2006, pp. 228-229.
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