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Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

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as just another kind of military opti<strong>on</strong> for warfighting.<br />

But despite much talk of “massive retaliati<strong>on</strong>” in the<br />

1950s, practical policy reflected a much more flexible<br />

attitude. Meanwhile, Henry Kissinger, Herman Kahn,<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> other strategists developed elaborate scenarios<br />

for nuclear use short of mutual assured destructi<strong>on</strong>.<br />

Forward-based ground TNWs were seen as enhancing<br />

deterrence through their “use-it-or-lose-it” quality.<br />

But for the most part, TNWs became a substitute<br />

for strategy since their low cost made it easy to simply<br />

acquire more of them.<br />

During the 1960s, this house of cards began to fold.<br />

Government officials <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> civilian strategists increasingly<br />

questi<strong>on</strong>ed the credibility of using TNWs <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

of the entire doctrine of limited nuclear war. By 1957,<br />

after exercises like Sagebrush, the U.S. Army had c<strong>on</strong>cluded<br />

that TNWs did not favor the defense. In additi<strong>on</strong>,<br />

<str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g> exercises made clear that Germany would<br />

be devastated through the effects of blast <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> fallout<br />

following even the limited employment of nuclear<br />

weap<strong>on</strong>s. <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g> governments, experiencing different<br />

strategic anxieties from their different geostrategic<br />

circumstances, disputed when <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> how to use—or<br />

threaten to use—these TNWs. U.S. officials generally<br />

wanted opti<strong>on</strong>s, firebreaks, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> bargaining time; Germany<br />

sought to avoid any increase in the possibility<br />

of any war occurring <strong>on</strong> German territory by insisting<br />

that <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g> threaten the early use of nuclear weap<strong>on</strong>s.<br />

TNWs, designed as instruments of reassurance to governments,<br />

became symbols of anxiety to large secti<strong>on</strong>s<br />

of their publics.<br />

By 1960, Kissinger <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> other analysts had noted the<br />

failure of the services to develop a coherent doctrine<br />

for TNWs, fundamental disagreements within <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g><br />

over them, <str<strong>on</strong>g>and</str<strong>on</strong>g> the problems for <str<strong>on</strong>g>NATO</str<strong>on</strong>g> strategy that<br />

5

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