Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

er reductions but only if Russia undertakes reciprocal
measures. Proposals to provide additional Article 5
reassurance through contingency planning <strong>and</strong> exercises
are welcomed, but with an equal insistence that
they cannot substitute for the deterrence provided
by the presence of U.S. warheads. One such national
representative revealed his scepticism of alternative
forms of reassurance when he remarked that the allies
would “remove the warheads <strong>and</strong> [then] not do the
exercises.” 9
The development of a <strong>NATO</strong> missile defense system
for the defense of territory has been welcomed by
the new members of the Alliance as strengthening the
transatlantic link <strong>and</strong> bolstering deterrence. However,
several members insist that missile defense performs
a different function in deterrence <strong>and</strong> should not be
seen as a replacement for the existing arrangements.
One national representative described missile defense
as “a flimsy substitute” 10 for these arrangements, particularly
in view of the impending reductions of U.S.
ground forces in Europe.
For these members, the general uncertainty in the
strategic environment <strong>and</strong> in relations with Russia
means that this is not the moment for <strong>NATO</strong> to make
changes to its strategy <strong>and</strong> that to do so would in fact
be sending the wrong message—in several directions.
It is sometimes said that Pol<strong>and</strong> is prepared to be more
flexible on this issue than other CEE members; some
observers see this merely as part of a less confrontational
relationship with the Big Neighbor. Polish concerns
have focussed on the need to do something about
Russian sub-strategic systems, a concern shared by all
members. This has meant an emphasis on the need
for a dialogue with Russia <strong>and</strong> initial steps aimed at
creating greater transparency of these systems, again
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