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near Central Europe <strong>and</strong> therefore were focused on the peril of a Warsaw Pact l<strong>and</strong> invasion along the Central Front. This gave a coherence <strong>and</strong> collective quality to the concerns of the European <strong>NATO</strong> nations. 35. The fact that the U.S. Navy was the only military force among the allies that could range across this vast expanse of territory also added to U.S. autonomy <strong>and</strong> leverage. In the nuclear weapons arena, these dynamics strengthened U.S. proclivities towards discretionary <strong>and</strong> opaque decisionmaking, dynamics that were compounded by the U.S. ability to store <strong>and</strong> operate these weapons from U.S. naval vessels <strong>and</strong> sovereign U.S. territory. U.S. sovereign territory included Pacific isl<strong>and</strong>s such as Guam but also included territorial concessions granted after World War II on the historical territory of allies, such as Subic Bay in the Philippines <strong>and</strong> Okinawa in Japan. 36. See Cha, pp. 163,168. For a similar point of view, see Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008, pp. 29-36. 37. See George R. Packard, “The United States-Japan Security Treaty at 50: Still a Gr<strong>and</strong> Bargain?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 2, March/April 2010, pp. 92-103. This reliance was explicitly nuclear. For instance, after the shock of China’s first nuclear test in October 1964, a substantial number of powerful Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leaders approached Prime Minister Sato Eisaku of Japan with a proposal that Japan should create its own nuclear arsenal. Sato let this be known to Ambassador Reischauer who immediately told Secretary of State Dean Rusk, <strong>and</strong> when Sato arrived for a summit meeting with President Johnson in Washington in January of 1965, he received assurances that the United States would extend its “nuclear umbrella” over Japan, thus obviating Japan’s going nuclear itself. This situation continues to this day. The author thanks George Packard for this insight. 38. For the Japanese government’s revelation of the existence of so-called “secret agreements” between Tokyo <strong>and</strong> Washington permitting US transit of nuclear weapons through Japanese ports <strong>and</strong> waters <strong>and</strong> the reintroduction of nuclear weapons to Okinawa after the isl<strong>and</strong>’s reversion to Japanese control, see Jeffrey Lewis, “More on U.S.-Japan ‘Secret Agreements,’” Armscontrolwonk.com, March 11, 2010, available from 103
lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/2660/more-on-us-japan-secretagreements. For documentary evidence of these agreements <strong>and</strong> how they were practiced, see Robert A. Wampler, “<strong>Nuclear</strong> Noh Drama: Tokyo, Washington, <strong>and</strong> the Case of the Missing <strong>Nuclear</strong> Agreements,” National Security Archive Briefing Book, October 13, 2009, available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb291/ index.htm. The Japanese government continues to deny that it secretly gave the United States permission in 1969 to use bases on Okinawa to store nuclear weapons in the event of war. See George R. Packard, Edwin O. Reischauer <strong>and</strong> the American Discovery of Japan, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, p. 318, n. 105. 39. See Hans M. Kristensen, Japan Under the <strong>Nuclear</strong> Umbrella: U.S. <strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Weapons</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Nuclear</strong> War Planning in Japan During the Cold War, Berkeley, CA: The Nautilus Institute, 1999, p. 19, citing declassified State Department cables. 40. See the collection of declassified U.S. Government documents contained in Wampler. 41. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, U.S.: Basic Books, 1997, p. 259. 42. Quoted in Hayes et al., American Lake, p. 231. 43. “U.S., S. Korea Delay OPCON Transfer Until 2015,” Stars <strong>and</strong> Stripes, June 27, 2010, available from www.stripes.com/news/ pacific/korea/u-s-s-korea-delay-opcon-transfer-until-2015-1.108947. 44. For an analysis of the current Asian nuclear l<strong>and</strong>scape, see Christopher P. Twomey, “Asia’s Complex Strategic Environment: <strong>Nuclear</strong> Multipolarity <strong>and</strong> Other Dangers,” Asia Policy, No. 11, January 2011, pp. 51-78. 45. “Japan Lobbied for Robust <strong>Nuclear</strong> Umbrella Before Policy Shift,” Kyodo News, November 23, 2009, available from www. breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9C54D680&showarticle=1&catnum=0. 46. “Obama Pledges <strong>Nuclear</strong> Umbrella for South Korea,” Korea Times, June 17, 2009, available from www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/ news/nation/2009/06/116_46976.html. 104
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Visit our website for other free pu
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***** Comments pertaining to this r
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6. Aspects of the Current Russian P
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21. Arms Control after START ......
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this incredible amount of destructi
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hundreds of U.S. weapons (a
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TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND <stron
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Security was an additional problem.
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embraced lessons learned from the 1
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I learned here of some of the deep
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CHAPTER 1 THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT Ri
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as just another kind of military op
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it, the Allies were unlikely to agr
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• Assets for future arms control
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ments are dissimilar. Whereas Europ
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CHAPTER 2 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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ombs in Europe as strategic weapons
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experiences of war, in a less moral
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Strangelovian image for NAT
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II. 1953-1963. U.S. STRATEGIC SUPER
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• For what political purposes mig
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widely heralded move to flexible re
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clear sentiment for the Alliance <s
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Nevertheless, Germany underst<stron
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first in order to break up his forc
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saw Pact lines to interdict strateg
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The Democratic People’s Republic
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given release authority by the Sovi
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III. 1963-1967. EMERGING DOUBTS CON
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esponse: without it, the Allies wer
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ous arms control groups argue that
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Why Did NATO Keep
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France were equipped with nuclear w
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slowly changing deterrence ethos wa
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through widespread protests, openly
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Page 88 and 89: 24. Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructe
Page 90 and 91: 49. Catherine McArdle Kelleher, “
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Page 94 and 95: 100. Corroborated by Catherine Kell
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Page 116 and 117: These shifts are the products both
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Page 148 and 149: On April 23, 1999, Viktor Nikolaevi
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36. Sergei Karaganov “Global Zero
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CHAPTER 6 ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT RU
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NATO countries. Du
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allistic missile defense (BMD), <st
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Meanwhile, the factor of China (wit
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Today, in fact, only the nuclear um
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By the same logic, preventing a pot
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diminishes still further Russian in
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1989 —April 12 SHORT-RANGE NUCLEA
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where Russian interest is higher th
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6. Kozin, “Five obstacles.” 7.
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CHAPTER 7 INFLUENCES ON RUSSIAN POL
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general and its ow
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are show of unanimity from nearly a
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ally; it is just that others are ac
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to direct Russian toward multilater
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armor, like T-62 tanks and<
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Reducing Non-Strategic Nucl
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The Russian inventory has been redu
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Under present conditions, the range
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Ws should be multilateral, with the
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continue the practice of conducting
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the General Staff Nikolai Makarov o
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CHAPTER 8 RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON N
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Yet these concerns are most likely
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Bush and Mikhail G
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anyone’s guess. As mentioned abov
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STRATEGY Russian NSNWs attracted in
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lored damage” (zadannyi ushcherb)
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intrigue pertaining to nuclear weap
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eaching political, military, <stron
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Inertia. The longer this position i
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In a similar vein, the Foreign Mini
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THE RUSSIAN NSNW POSITION: LIMITS A
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tated to what it calls an “integr
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 8 1. “Zayavlen
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13. The 12th Main Department of the
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PART III EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 227
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ope is illustrative of a more funda
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maintaining these weapons or their
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CHAPTER 10 THE ROLE AND PLACE OF TA
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positions, preoccupations,
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cohesion and solid
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ferred to by the now familiar term
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The second track is an effort to de
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The United States. The traditional
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the nuclear discussions apply only
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supported by other members. However
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cerning its nuclear posture. On the
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tial expert on the dangers of nucle
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8. This is reminiscent of the posit
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a London or Paris perspective, thei
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One of the most important factors w
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mer Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chie
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Armed Service Air and</stro
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Nunn in 2007 and 2
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that the debate on a nuclear-free w
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modify the Alliance’s nuclear pos
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years. Signs of progress include th
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on a modified CFE regime an
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9. See Miles A. Pomper, William Pot
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Paper, No. 7, Washington, DC: Arms
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eventual elimination are considered
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In the post-bipolar international s
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levels of enthusiasm, most European
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DIFFERING THREAT ASSESSMENTS AND AL
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troops in 2008 and
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that NATO as a who
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distinction between tactical <stron
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12. Author’s interview with a sen
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19. NATO’s argum
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31. Valasek, p. 24. 32. Lukasz Kule
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CHAPTER 13 EUROPE, NATO</st
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not reached a clear consensus on wh
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In an environment in which there is
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ing of signals within the Alliance.
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NATO foreign minis
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mean that the strategic lan
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weapon holdings did not exceed 225
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attitude to how nuclear weapons wil
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ghanistan will also help to determi
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German territory. On the other h<st
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PART IV AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 321
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siles and aircraft
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ment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Eur
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that these weapons still have a rol
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with nuclear weapons, and</
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homeland. The trad
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However, if the United States were
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(estimated, to be 150-200) of U.S.
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er-projection capabilities, <strong
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ventional weapons. Unlike the perce
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any U.S. NSNWs deployed or stored i
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ganizational changes in recent year
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It is unrealistic to believe, as so
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Prague agenda with its goal of glob
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has a different set of critical qua
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 15 1. Assistant
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15. Ibid., p. xii. 16. Ibid. 17. Ib
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Hans M. Kristensen, “Nucl
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52. See Jeffrey A. Larsen a
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Hence, whatever course the Allies s
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self from the conflict. Of course,
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arguments by and l
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cal to the later stages of this cam
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The fundamentals of Smart Defense a
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deterrence and def
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ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 16 1. These are
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CHAPTER 17 ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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Two of the greatest enduring threat
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a monkey to an altitude of 120 km (
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including a “dual capable” (nuc
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By the end of the Cold War, in 1991
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U.S. Focus and Int
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eset by conflict, deterrence seeks
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Command in 2010. H
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y arms control and
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into account the disparity between
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Furthermore, the United States <str
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table price human beings must pay t
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16. See www.tradereform.org/wp-cont
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PART V ARMS CONTROL AS AN OPTION 40
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ise as a vehicle for regulating <st
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arms control to address the perceiv
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posite discussion within the contex
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CHAPTER 19 ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS FOR
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U.S. AND RUSSIAN NON-STRATEGIC NUCL
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into the discussion is that it woul
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get missiles on NATO</stron
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ficials have announced a major 10-y
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the INF Treaty banned all INF missi
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Others have also suggested that tra
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ample of the latter, in 1991 Presid
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certain percentage, say 50 percent.
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heads. Nondeployed strategic warhea
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ily in Washington’s judgment, <st
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publican president is less clear at
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10. “Strategic Concept for the De
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CHAPTER 20 TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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Most of the attempted adaptation <s
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ight metric (and t
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weapons (NSNWs)? A look at the key
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other, has ever gained serious cons
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who occasionally address other thea
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most of the other parties. Russia
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security concerns and</stro
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objectives and out
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CHAPTER 21 ARMS CONTROL AFTER START
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withdrawal as part of a wider disen
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ience with the Anti-Ballistic Missi
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strengthening of first-strike stabi
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ons away from the territory of <str
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is the relationship between them th
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would have added credibility were i
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still making a substantial contribu
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tionship between transparency <stro
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NATO WILL SURVIVE
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As in the past, the most likely cau
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summit on the effective control of
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deployed to Europe to approximately
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NATO policymakers.
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One of the alliances, the Warsaw Pa
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Hungary, and Slova
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statement at the conclusion of the
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anti-ballistic missiles on Polish t
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Following the meeting of OSCE forei
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inform Russia of any significant ch
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are difficult to correlate complete
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West. President Obama noted such a
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ing agreements. It must also combin
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19. Ibid. 20. Lachowski, p. 5. 21.
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PART VI CONCLUSION 505
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that means. Today, this seems to be
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more prosaic level, the presence of
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fence and Foreign
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JEFFREY A. LARSEN is a Senior Scien
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GUY B. ROBERTS was until recently <
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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE Major General
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