Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

100. Corroborated by Catherine Kelleher: “Available evidence
through exercises or historical experience does not suggest
that wide political consultation will be smooth or timely. Some
simulations have involved 3 days at a minimum to get a clear decision,”
Kelleher, 1987, p. 464.
101. Philip Petersen, “One of the leading experts on Soviet
strategy in the Defense Intelligence Agency,” quoted in Barrass,
pp. 213-214.
102. Diego Ruiz Palmer, quoted in Barrass, p. 338.
103. Ibid., pp. 339-341.
104. Barrass, pp. 297-301.
105. Kelleher, p. 453.
106 . Bluth, pp. 261-262.
107. Barrass, p. 191.
108. “It seems probable that the DPRK’s nuclear aspirations
were triggered at least in part by the South Korean program,”
Joshua D. Pollack, No Exit: North Korea <strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Weapons</strong> <strong>and</strong> International
Security, London, UK: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 2011, p. 80.
109. Dan Plesch of the British American Security Information
Council, in the Guardian, London, UK, May 3, 1990.
110. Ibid.
111. Quoted in Wheeler, p. 137.
112. Wheeler, pp. 138-139.
113. Alex<strong>and</strong>er Pikayev, “<strong>Tactical</strong> <strong>Nuclear</strong> <strong>Weapons</strong>,” available
from icnnd.org/Documents/Pikayev_<strong>Tactical</strong>_<strong>Nuclear</strong>_<strong>Weapons</strong>.
doc.
73