Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

troops in 2008 <strong>and</strong> by the decision of U.S. President
Barack Obama in 2009 to modify the plans for the deployment
of components of a missile defense system
in Pol<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the Czech Republic.
The perspective of the new <strong>NATO</strong> members on
TNWs does not seem completely intransigent, however.
It is likely to be negotiable, especially if balanced
by a credible <strong>NATO</strong> commitment—essentially, a U.S.
commitment—to their defense by other means. 30 Indeed,
according to Tomas Valasek, “The [tactical nuclear]
weapons are a potent symbol of the transatlantic
bond, but not necessarily the only, or irreplaceable,
symbol.” 31
As has been rightly argued, it is primarily the nonnuclear
dimension of the deterrence policy of <strong>NATO</strong>
that must be improved to increase the importance of
the collective defense <strong>and</strong> deterrence function of the
Alliance. 32 <strong>NATO</strong>, <strong>and</strong> especially the United States,
could consider alternatives to or compensations for
the forward deployment of TNWs, such as an increase
in conventional forces (“boots on the ground”) or the
deployment in the region of substantial components
of Obama’s redesigned “Phased Adaptive Approach”
to missile defense, to meet the new <strong>NATO</strong> members’
need for reassurance.
Undoubtedly, the issue must be addressed with
great caution because it is difficult to reach agreement
on perceptions <strong>and</strong> symbols, especially in the current
period of profound transformation <strong>and</strong> reorganization
of Euro-Atlantic security. 33 Decisions that are not
shared risk weakening the cohesion of the Alliance on
which the credibility of <strong>NATO</strong> depends. The priority
on both sides of the Atlantic is to avoid casting doubt
on the principle of indivisibility in the Alliance’s security.
Consequently, the debate on TNWs is widely per-
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