Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO.pdf - Program on Strategic ...

ience with the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty)
that future administrations would abide by such a
commitment. It is precisely because missile defenses
are believed—by many in both the United States <strong>and</strong>
Russia—to have the long-term potential to change the
future strategic balance that agreement to cooperate in
their operation is so difficult.
In the case of NSNWs, by contrast, the technical
characteristics of the systems in question are wellknown
<strong>and</strong> unlikely to change fundamentally. Support
for Russian NSNW deployment is reported to
be strong in the Russian Navy, which relies on TNWs
to offset U.S. naval superiority <strong>and</strong> defend its strategic
missile submarines. Like <strong>NATO</strong> in the Cold War,
moreover, Russia believes that it may need a significant
sub-strategic arsenal in order to offset the weakness of
its conventional forces in the event of an invasion. But,
as in <strong>NATO</strong>, Russian air <strong>and</strong> ground forces may be
increasingly reluctant to devote substantial resources
to maintaining an asset that cannot be used in more
limited conflicts. Moreover, in contrast to <strong>NATO</strong>, the
very size of Russia’s arsenal—estimated at several
thous<strong>and</strong>—should permit significant reductions to be
made before reaching whatever minimum force levels
its services now believe are needed. On the other
h<strong>and</strong>, the heightening of the political saliency of these
weapons within <strong>NATO</strong> may have made it harder for
Russia to make unilateral reductions in its own forces
without an expectation of getting something in return.
BROADENING START
Serious progress in efforts to make reciprocal
NSNW reductions will depend on there being political
circumstances, in both Russia <strong>and</strong> the United States,
which favor such a process. If such conditions were
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